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Workers' Compensation
By NORMAN E. HARNED*
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky's Workers' Compensation Act' (Act) continues to be
a topic of frequent legislative revision and judicial interpretation.
While the appellate courts were attempting to interpret the sweeping
legislative amendments of 1980,2 the 1982 General Assembly
returned to make additional changes to the Act.' This Survey will
examine the noteworthy 1982 legislative changes, as well as signifi-
cant court decisions from the Survey period, 1981 to 1983. The
cases address such issues as apportionment, reopening of decisions,
presumptions and coverage.
I. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Although a number of changes made by the 1982 Kentucky
General Assembly could be classified as housekeeping, and were
not of the scope of the 1980 amendments, 5 these recent changes
will have a practical effect on the practitioner. The most impor-
tant changes altered the method of benefit payments between the
* Partner in the firm of Cole Harned & Broderick, Bowling Green, Kentucky. LL.B.
1965, University of Kentucky. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Scott
A. Bachert in the preparation of this Article.
I KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 342.010-.990 (Bobbs-Merrill 1983) [hereinafter cited as
KRS].
2 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 2, 1980, ch. 104, §§ 1-23, 1980 Ky. Acts 191, 191. See generally
Basil, Kentucky Law Survey-Workers' Compensation, 69 Ky. L.J. 687 (1980-81)(discusses
the 1980 legislative changes).
I See Act of Apr. 12, 1982, ch. 447 § 11, 1982 Ky. Acts 1510, 1518 (codified at KRS
§ 342.350 (1983)); Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 426 §§ 1-3, 1982 Ky. Acts 1436, 1436 (codified
at KRS § 342.316, .340, .710 (1983)); Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 278 §§ 16-23, 1982 Ky. Acts
729, 735 (codified at KRS § 342.120, .121, .122, .123, .185, .316, .720, .730 (1983)); Act
of Mar. 26, 1982, ch. 141, § 91, 1982 Ky. Acts 245, 291 (codified at 342.160 (1983)); Act
of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 7, § 1, 1982 Ky. Acts 12, 12 (codified at KRS § 342.040 (1983)).
4 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 278, § 22, 1982 Ky. Acts 729, 741 (codified at
KRS § 342.720 (1983)) (increasing the employer's liability for burial expenses from $1,500
to $2,500); Act of Feb. 18, 1982, ch. 7, § 1, 1982 Ky. Acts 12, 12 (codified at § KRS 342.040)
(increasing the interest rate on past due benefits from six percent to twelve percent per
annum).
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 2, 1980, ch. 104, §§ 1-23, 1980 Ky. Acts 191, 191 (codified
in scattered sections of KRS ch. 342).
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employer and the Special Fund and created the Kentucky Rein-
surance Association.
6
A. Payment of Apportioned Benefits and Kentucky
Reinsurance Association
The 1982 General Assembly made no changes in the law as it
affects apportionment of liability for income benefits between the
employer and employee; however, that legislature did change the
procedure for the payment of such benefits.7 Prior to the 1982
amendments, upon an award of compensation or settlement, the
Workers' Compensation Board (Board) fixed the respective
liabilities of the employer and the Special Fund on a percentage
basis as directed by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section
342.120.1 The employer and the Special Fund would then pay their
corresponding percentages of the weekly benefits awarded to the
worker. 9 As a result of the amendments, the employer is now
obligated to pay all the benefits to the employee until the percen-
tage of income benefits paid equals the percentage of disability ap-
portioned to the employer. 0 Thus, only after the employer's liabili-
ty has been exhausted does the Special Fund begin to pay the
percentage of liability attributed to it. ' For example, on a perma-
nent partial disability award for 425 weeks in which liability was
apportioned on a fifty percent basis between the employer and the
Fund, the employer would pay all benefits awarded for the first
212 1/2 weeks, then the Special Fund would begin paying benefits
following this period. For total disability awards, or awards for
death, benefits are to be paid based upon an actuarial table to be
adopted by the Board. 2
The new statute is silent as to any method by which the
employer can recoup benefits paid in the event the benefits awarded
6 See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 278, § 16-17, 19, 1982 Ky. Acts 729, 735 (codified
at KRS § 342.120, .122, .123).
7Id.
' KRS § 342.120 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (amended 1982).
See KRS § 342.120(3)-(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
See KRS § 342.120(4) (1983).
KRS § 342.120(5) (1983).
KRS § 342.120(6)(b) (1983). The Board has not yet adopted the necessary actuarial
regulations to effectuate this statute. Telephone interview with Betsy Garriott, Workers'
Compensation Board Clerk-Administrative Specialist, Frankfort, Kentucky (Oct. 31, 1983).
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to a worker or surviving spouse are terminated prior to the end
of the period of recovery. 3 Presumably, the employer would be
in a position to seek reimbursement from the Special Fund for the
portion of benefits paid which is greater than its percentage of the
actual award made by the Board.'
4
While changing the method of payment by the Special Fund,
the 1982 General Assembly also empowered the Special Fund to
retain and invest the benefits owed to the employee. To enable these
sums to be invested and handled properly, the legislature created
the Kentucky Reinsurance Association.'"
These changes allowed the Kentucky Reinsurance Association
to receive the insurance premiums paid into the Special Fund by
the subscribers to the workers' compensation system and to invest
those sums prior to paying awarded benefits to the employees.' 6
Allowing the Kentucky Reinsurance Association to hold these
moneys for a period of years and earn the investment income
should, in theory, prevent or at least limit increases in the sums
levied upon the subscribers to the compensation system.
On initial evaluation, this legislative enactment appears to of-
fer a potential reduction in the future cost of workers' compensa-
tion coverage to the employers and insurance carriers. One could
question, however, whether the Kentucky Reinsurance Association
will in fact be a better investor or curator of these funds than the
insurance carriers, self-insured groups and the individual self-
employed employers. The only certainty is that another bureaucracy
has been created and substantial additional expense has been
incurred 7 without a corresponding certainty of benefit.
. See KRS § 342.120(4)-(5) (1983).
1, Cf. 803 Ky. ADauN. REGS 25:030 (1983) (mechanism whereby the employer could
seek reimbursement from the Special Fund under the former method of payment of benefits).
This regulation would not apply to the statute as amended.
11 See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 278, § 16, 1982 Ky. Acts 729, 735 (codified at KRS
§ 342.123).
" See KRS § 342.123 (1983). Prior to the amendment, the Special Fund was funded
by a tax on all insurance carriers which write workers' compensation insurance, self in-
surance groups and self-insured employers. KRS § 342.122(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (amend-
ed 1982). Additional assessments were authorized to be made if the Secretary of Finance
and the Commissioner of Labor found that the Special Fund tax levied was insufficient.
KRS § 342.122(5) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (amended 1982). The investment income earned subse-
quent to the 1982 amendments now provides an additional source of income. See KRS §
342.122-.123 (1983).




B. Expansion of Benefits for Permanent Partial Disability
During the 1982 session, the General Assembly continued its
recent experiments with changing the formula for payment of per-
manent partial disability benefits."8 Prior to the 1980 amendments,
permanent partial benefits had been lifetime benefits.' 9 As a part
of an effort to reduce compensation costs to employers, the 1980
General Assembly curtailed the benefits for permanent partial
disability to a maximum of 425 weeks, less any period of temporary
total disability for which the employee was compensated.2" These
benefits were subject, however, to the further limitation that all
benefits for permanent partial disability would cease when the
employee became eligible for the normal old-age benefits payable
under the Federal Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance
Act.2'
Apparently, the legislature decided that the benefits to the
workers had been curtailed too much, and in 1982 once again
amended KRS section 342.730 to remove the limitations for the
(a) For liabilities for injuries & occupational diseases incurred on or after July
1, 1983: 1. If on an annual review of the special fund the secretary of finance
[commissioner of labor] finds that the special fund tax to be levied pursuant to
this section may be [is] insufficient to pay prospective amounts which may be
[such claims] awarded under the special fund provisions, he shall advise the Ken-
tucky reinsurance association [commissioner of revenue] in writing of such fact
and shall further request and give specifications for the association to make a
proposal for reinsuring the liabilities of the special fund and for distributing the
cost of such reinsurance to the subscribers of the association. The proposal will
contain a total cost for such reinsurance, including the administrative costs of
making benefit payments from subscribers and collecting premiums from
subscribers. The total cost of reinsurance shall be distributed among the
subscribers based on the "adjusted cost" of every subscriber unless the proposal
sets forth another basis of cost distribution that the secretary of finance finds
to be more equitable than "adjusted cost. "
2. The secretary of finance shall then advertise for bids from qualified bidders
for reinsurance of the liabilities of the special fund as set out in the proposal
of the Kentucky reinsurance association.
(Italicized words indicate additions. Bracketed words indicate repealed segments).
11 Compare Act of Apr. 2, 1980, ch. 104, § 15, 1980 Ky. Acts, 191.200 (codified at
KRS 342.730) (Cum. Supp. 1980) with Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 278, § 23, 1982 Ky. Acts,
729, 742 (codified at KRS 342.730).
19 See KRS § 342.730(l)(b) (1977) (amended 1980, 1982). The use of the term "lifetime"
is somewhat misleading, as income benefits were paid only for the duration of disability.
See KRS § 342.730(l)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (amended 1982).
21 Id. See also The Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1976 & West Supp. 1982).
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period of temporary total disability22 and the provisions preven-
ting payment beyond age sixty-five. 23 Thus, an award for perma-
nent partial disability will extend for 425 weeks regardless of any
period of temporary disability or the age of the worker. The
legislature also added that "medical benefits shall be paid for the
duration of the disability."24 This segment of the amendment ap-
parently extends the period of the employer's liability for medical
expenses to the duration of the worker's disability, instead of
limiting the employer's liability for medical expenses to the period
of time for which income benefits are paid. Previously, employers
and insurance carriers would not pay the medical expenses incurred
by an employee after the 425 weeks of income benefits expired.
Whether carriers will begin to pay medical benefits beyond the 425
week period without a court decision interpreting the amendment
remains to be seen.
C. Miscellaneous Housekeeping Changes
The 1982 Kentucky legislature made a number of other minor
changes in the Act.25 The amendment to KRS section 342.185
changes the period for filing an application of adjustment following
the suspension of payment of voluntary benefits from one year to
two years.2 Prior to the 1982 amendments, both KRS section
342.185 and section 342.270 required that a claim be filed within
22 Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 278, § 23, 1982 Ky. Acts 729, 742 (codified at KRS
§ 342.730 makes the following changes in KRS § 342.730(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980):
Any temporary total disability period within the maximum period for perma-
nent, partial disability payments shall [not] extend the maximum period but shall
not [not] make payable a weekly benefit exceeding that determined in subsec-
tion (1)(a) of this section. Notwithstanding any section of KRS 342 to the con-
trary, there shall be no minimum weekly income benefit for permanent partial
disability and medical benefits shall be paid for the duration of the disability.
(bracketed material deleted by Amendment, italicized material added by Amendment).
23 Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 278, § 23, 1982 Ky. Acts 729, 742 (codified at KRS §
342.730) eliminates the phrase, "but such benefits shall not be paid after the employe[e]
becomes eligible for normal old age benefits under the federal old age, survivors and disabil-
ity act," from KRS § 342.730(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980). 42 U.S.C.S. § 402(a) (1973 & Cum.
Supp. 1983) provides that individuals complying with the statute are entitled to old age
benefits at age 65.
24 See KRS § 342.730(1)(b).
" See note 3, supra for a list of the sections amended.




two years after an injury, but section 342.185 provided only one
year for filing a claim after suspension of voluntary benefits, and
section 342.270 allowed two years." Both sections now require a
claim to be filed within two years after the suspension of volun-
tary income benefits.28
No specific statutory authorization existed prior to 1982 for
the use of vocational or occupational experts, although their use
has long been a part of the practice of workers' compensation. The
amendment to KRS section 342.316(2)(b)(4) now grants the
employer, Special Fund or other interested party the right to have
an evaluation by a vocational expert.2" This amendment would not
be worthy of comment were it not for the fact that the authoriza-
tion for vocational evaluation was only granted for occupational
diseases." However, in light of the prevalent use of vocational ex-
perts in both occupational disease and injury cases, the legislature
likely did not intend to limit the use of vocational experts to only
occupational disease cases. Perhaps this statutory authorization for
the use of vocational experts was intended to have been made a
part of KRS section 342.205, which gives the employer and the
Special Fund the right to have an independent medical evaluation.
II. JUDICIAL HIGHLIGHTS
A. Apportionment
The courts and litigants continue to grapple with the concep-
tual basis for allocating the liability for disability benefits between
employers and the Special Fund.3" In two recent cases involving
the liability of the Special Fund, the court of appeals clearly
delineated the distinction between the compensable injury and
" See KRS § 342.185 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (amended 1982); KRS § 342.270 (1983).
21 See KRS § 342.185, .270 (1983). For a definition of voluntary payments of com-
pensation, see Hetteberg v. City of Newport, 616 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. 1981) (voluntary payments
under KRS § 342.185 include both income benefits and medical benefits).
29 See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 426, § 1, 1982 Ky. Acts 1436, 1436 (codified at KRS
§ 342.316 (1983)).
10 Cf. § 342.316(2)(b)(1) ("The application shall set forth the work history of the ap-
plicant with a concise description of injurious exposure to a specific occupational
disease... and shall also include... two (2) written medical reports supporting his claim.")
"' The relative contributions from employer and Special Fund are fixed by statute in
occupational disease cases. See KRS § 342.316(13). But apportionment of liability for an
injury is determined on a case by case basis. See KRS § 342.120.
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liability for benefits once compensability has been established. In
Land v. Sparks32 and Land v. Burden33 the court affirmed
Workers' Compensation Board decisions which had allocated
liability to the Special Fund for all disability resulting from an
arousal of a pre-existing, non-disabling disease or condition,34 ex-
cepting only that disability attributable to a prior active condition. 5
The Board had found in both cases that none of the resulting
disability was attributable to the new injury alone,36 which effec-
tively relieved the employer of any liability to the employee for
weekly income benefits.37
In each case the Special Fund contended on appeal that because
the new injury which aroused the dormant, non-disabling condi-
tion was not compensable by the employer, no liability should be
imposed upon the Special Fund.38 The court in both Starks and
Burden found that an employer is liable for payment of benefits
when an employee has suffered a "work-related harmful change
in the human organism." 3 Once compensability is established, a
different statute, KRS section 342.120 governs the apportionment
of liability for compensation payments as between the employer
and the Special Fund °.4  The fact that KRS section 342.120 shifts
liability for payment of compensation to the Special Fund "does
not render an otherwise compensable injury non-compensable." 4 '
The rationale of the 1981 Starks and Burden decisions was not
32 628 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
626 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
628 S.W.2d at 348; 626 S.W.2d at 222.
" 628 S.W.2d at 348; 626 S.W.2d at 222. An employee's prior active disability is not
compensable. KRS § 342.120.
11 See 628 S.W.2d at 347; 626 S.W.2d at 222.
3' See KRS § 342.120(3).
1' The Special Fund based its argument in both cases on the use of the phrase "subse-
quent compensable injury" found in KRS § 342.120(1)(b),(3). The Fund contended that
since the employee in both Burden and Starks did not receive compensation benefits from
the employer for his latest injury, there had been no "subsequent compensable injury" and
therefore no liability for the Special Fund. 628 S.W.2d at 346; 626 S.W.2d at 221.
11 628 S.W.2d at 348; 626 S.W.2d at 222. KRS § 342.620(1) (1983) defines injury as
"any work related harmful change in the human organism arising out of and in the course
of employment." KRS § 342.610(1) (1983) provides that "[elvery employer subject to the
Workers' Compensation Act shall be liable for compensation for injury. . . without regard
to fault as to the cause of the injury."
" KRS § 342.120(4)-(5). See 628 S.W.2d at 348; 626 S.W.2d at 222.
4 628 S.W.2d at 348; 626 S.W.2d at 222.
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applied to two cases decided in 1983 involving heart attacks. In
Wells v. Collins2 and Wells v. Dal-Camp, Inc.,"3 the respective
employees had an underlying condition of arteriosclerotic heart
disease"' and suffered a work-related heart attack. The Board in
each case apportioned 75 percent of the liability to the Special Fund
and 25 percent to the employer.1
5
In Wells v. Dal-Camp, Inc., all of the physicians testified that
the exertion by the employee at work would not have brought on
the fatal heart attack or any other disability had it not been for
the presence of the underlying abnormal blood vessel condition. 6
The court of appeals concluded, based upon the unanimity of the
testimony of the physicians, that as matter of law there was no
substantial evidence to support the apportionment made by the
Board. 7 In Wells v. Collins, all but one physician testified that
the exertional trauma alone would not have caused the death of
the employee were it not for the underlying arteriosclerotic heart
disease. 8 The Board-appointed physician, however, still attributed
25 percent of the disability to the exertional trauma." The opinion
does not disclose whether the Board-appointed physician was asked
to determine whether the employee would have suffered an injury
as a result of the work he was performing in the absence of any
pre-existing dormant arteriosclerotic condition .5  Since adequate
medical evidence in the record supported the findings, the decision
was affirmed.
51
41 30 Ky. L. SUMM. 6, at 3 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1983), reh'g denied, No.
82-CA-1539-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1983) [hereinafter cited as KLS], discretionary rev.
granted, 83-SC-389-DG (June 29, 1983).
" 30 KLS 4, at 5 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1983), discretionary rev. granted, 30 KLS
8, at 15 (June 29, 1983).
" 30 KLS 6, at 3-4 (employee had a dormant coronary arteriosclerotic condition);
30 KLS 4, at 5-6 (employee had abnormal coronary vessels).
11 30 KLS 6, at 4; 30 KLS 4, at 6.
46 30 KLS 4, at 6.
47 Id.
41 30 KLS 6, at 4. One physician attributed the sole cause of the heart attack to the
pre-existing arteriosclerotic heart disease, as opposed to the physical exertion. This physi-
cian expressed the opinion that the heart disease was not dormant. Id.
49 Id.
1° Id. In order to achieve 100% apportionment to the Special Fund, it is necessary
that the employee would have suffered no disability had it not been for the dormant, pre-
existing disease or condition. KRS § 342.120(3).
1 30 KLS 6, at 5.
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Of more interest than the ultimate result in Collins was the
reasoning used to achieve that result. The court concluded that the
Board cannot find complete liability against either the employer
or the Special Fund, but must apportion liability between the
employer and the Fund. 2 The court acknowledged that generally
an individual without an underlying health problem will not suf-
fer a heart attack under simple physical exertion, and that
arteriosclerosis alone will probably culminate in a heart attack
without the intervention of work related stress." Judge McDonald,
writing for the court, stated, however, that if the Special Fund were
held liable for the full amount of the benefits under such facts,
the employer would probably never be liable for benefits in heart
attack cases."4 Further, the court viewed the very word "appor-
tionment" to mean that liability must be divided between two or
more parties; one cannot place the entire liability for benefits on
one party and still "apportion."" From this perspective, the court
concluded that neither the statute nor case law supported an in-
terpretation that the Special Fund could be liable for the entire
award. 6
The court's conclusion is plainly contrary to the language of
KRS section 342.120 that the employer is liable only for the degree
of disability which would have resulted had there been no pre-
existing disability or dormant disease or condition which had been
aroused by the injury." The court stated that if a work connec-
tion exists between an incident of exertion and the heart at-
tack,"then the employer is liable for a proportionate part of the
52 Id.
I d. at 4.
54 Id.
" Id. at 5. The Court relied, in part, on the decision of Moore v. Square D Co., 518
S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1975). However, any reliance upon this case was misplaced, as Moore
dealt with the question of causation in heart attack cases, as opposed to apportionment.
In Moore, a Board decision which apportioned 100% liability to the employer was reversed
by the Court on the basis that once the evidence of pre-existing condition is before the Board,
the Board should have demanded evidence of apportionment be produced. Id. at 784-85.
The Collins court mistakenly relied on this holding to require an apportionment between
the Fund and the employer in every heart attack case.
6 The court, in effect, ignored the cases of Wells v. Dal-Camp, 30 KLS 4, at 5; Land
v. Starks, 628 S.W.2d at 346; Land v. Burden, 626 S.W.2d at 221 in making this
determination.
" See KRS § 342.120(4).
1983-84]
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award, even if the same exertion and stress would have caused no
injury to a healthy individual.""8 It is clear that the Collins deci-
sion confused the concept of compensability with apportionment.
This language could be considered only dicta in light of the fact
that the court of appeals in Collins needed only to decide whether
testimony of the Board-appointed physician was sufficient to sup-
port the Board's findings, but this decision will still cast some
uncertainty on the law of apportionment when compared with
Starks, Burden and Dal-Camp.
B. Adequacy of Findings of Fact by the Board
The extent to which the Board is required to make findings of
fact to support its ultimate conclusions has been a topic for fre-
quent appellate review. In Shields v. Pittsburgh and Midway Coal
Mining Co.,9 the court reviewed prior decisions dealing with the
sufficiency of Board findings and distilled these decisions into con-
crete guidelines. 6 The court affirmed the fundamental adminis-
trative law principle that the Board, as the fact finder, must set
forth in its opinion the basic facts which support the ultimate
conclusion. 6 This principle would "require the Board to support
its conclusions with facts drawn from the evidence in each case so
that both sides may be dealt with fairly and be properly apprised
of the basis for the decision." ' 62 Such an opinion is necessary in
order for "the [c]ourt, upon review, to determine whether the ad-
ministrative agency had acted within its powers" 63 in its conclu-
sions on such issues as work-related injury64 and occupational
disability.65
" 30 KLS 6, at 5.
634 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
60 Id. at 444 (construing Marshall County v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 519 S.W.2d
616 (Ky. 1975); Caller v. Ison, 508 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1974); Pearl v. Marshall, 491 S.W.2d
837 (Ky. 1973); Energy Regulation Comm'n v. Kentucky Power Co., 605 S.W.2d 46 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1980); Chemetron Corp. v. McKinley, 574 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978);
McCracken County Health Spa v. Henson, 568 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
61 634 S.W.2d at 444. KRS § 342.275 (1983) requires the Board to submit with the
record "[t]he award, order or decision, together with a statement of the findings of fact,
rulings of law and any other matters pertinent to the question at issue."
62 634 S.W.2d at 444.
63 Id. at 443.
64 See id. at 443-44 (citing McCracken County Health Spa v. Henson, 568 S.W.2d
at 240).
6 See id. (citing Chemetron Corp. v. McKinley, 574 S.W.2d at 332).
[Vol. 72
1983-841 WORKERS' COMPENSATION
C. Defining an Injury of Appreciable Proportions
In Hester v. United Parcel Services,66 the court of appeals, in
an unpublished opinion, once again had the opportunity to con-
sider the elusive concept of whether an employee had suffered an
injury of appreciable proportions."' Hester is the first case to in-
terpret the 1980 amendments to KRS section 342.730(1)(b)." In
Hester, the employee severed his Achilles tendon and, after thirteen
weeks of temporary total disability, returned to his regular job.
The medical testimony ascribed a ten percent functional impair-
ment to the injury, but the physician was of the opinion that the
employee could perform his regular job and do just about anything
with minimal pain.6 9 The Board denied an award of permanent dis-
ability and concluded the injury was not of appreciable propor-
tions since there was no probable loss of future earning capacity."
The Board's decision was affirmed since the employee failed to
show a decrease in wage earning capacity or loss of ability to com-
pete for employment, 7' as required under the KRS section
342.620(11) definition of disability.
7 2
66 30 KLS 8, at 6 (Ky. Ct. App. July 7, 1983), discretionary rev. denied, 30 KLS 14,
at 13 (Nov. 24, 1983). Opinion ordered not to be published.
67 Id. The concept of an "injury of appreciable proportions" was introduced in
Osborne v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968).
6, KRS § 342.730(1)(b) currently provides:
(1) Income benefits for disability shall be paid to the employe as follows:
(b) For permanent, partial disability, sixty-six and two-thirds [percent] (662/3%)
of the employe's average weekly wage but not more than seventy-five percent
(75%) of the state average weeldy wage as determined by KRS 342.740, multiplied
by his percentage of disability caused by the injury or occupational disease as deter-
mined by "guides to the evaluation of permanent impairment." American Medical
Association, 1977 edition, or by his percentage of disability as determined under
KRS 342.620(11), whichever is greater, for a maximum period, from the date
the disability arises, of four hundred twenty-five (425) weeks. Any temporary
total disability period within the maximum period for permanent, partial disability
benefits shall extend the maximum period but shall not make payable a weekly
benefit exceeding that determined in subsection (1)(a) of this section. Notwith-
standing any section of KRS Chapter 342 to the contrary, there shall be no
minimum weekly income benefit for permanent partial disability and medical
benefits shall be paid for the duration of the disability.
69 30 KLS 8, at 6.
70 Id.
" Id. at 7.
72 KRS § 342.620(11) defines "disability" to mean:
[A] decrease of wage earning capacity due to injury or loss of ability to com-
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The 1980 amendments to section 342.730(l)(b) provide for a
permanent partial disability award based upon the greater of oc-
cupational disability, as determined under section 342.620(11), or
the functional impairment as determined by the "American Medical
Association (AMA) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Im-
pairment," 1977 Edition. 73 Hester made clear that any functional
disability must be compensated, even if an employee does not have
an injury of appreciable proportions under KRS section
342.620(11). 7' The court concluded, however, that the employee
bears the burden of proving a medical functional impairment under
the AMA guides. Without such evidence, the Board was unable
to make the comparison mandated by statute and had no choice
but to proceed to the determination of occupational disability under
section 342.620(11). 71 Since the only medical evidence in the record
showed that the employee returned to work and could do anything
necessary, the Board's finding of no occupational disability was
not clearly erroneous.
76
A precursor to the decision in Hester came in Jones v. Institute
of Electronic Technology,77 decided under the statutes as they ex-
isted prior to the 1980 amendments.78 Jones was employed by the
Institute of Electronic Technology when he "suffered a work-
related injury which resulted in the amputation of a portion of the
distal phalange of his ring and little fingers on his right hand." 79
pete to obtain the kind of work the employe is customarily able to do, in the
area where he lives, taking into consideration his age, occupation, education, ef-
fect upon employe's general health of continuing in the kind of work he is
customarily able to do, and impairment or disfigurement.
" See KRS § 342.730(l)(b). The AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N Co ITrrEE oN RATING
OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PEMANENT IMPAIR-
MENT (2d ed. 1977) provides a comprehensive system for the evaluation of physical impair-
ment and defines "permanent impairment" as "any anatomic or functional abnormality
or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved, which abnormality or loss
the physician considers stable or nonprogressive at the time evaluation is made." Id. at iii.
14 "The [1980] amendment requiring ... reference [to the American Medical Associa-
tion Guides] obviously indicates the legislative intent to retain functional impairment as
being compensable since the Guide's purpose is to determine functional disability." 30 KLS
8, at 6.
11 Id. at 7.
76 Id. at 6.
77 613 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1981).
7, See id. at 423.
7" Id. at 420.
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The Board awarded Jones compensation under the schedule of
benefits set forth in KRS section 342.730(1)(c).8 ° No finding was
made under KRS section 342.730(1)(c)(27), which provided:
If ... the effects of any of the injuries, or disabilities, from oc-
cupational diseases, or losses, mentioned in this section adversely
affect a workman's ability to labor, or limit his occupational op-
portunities to obtain the kind of work he is customarily able to
do; his compensation benefits shall not be limited to the amounts
provided by this section, and he shall be awarded compensation
benefits under some other applicable or appropriate section of
this chapter which would provide more compensation benefits
for his disability.8 '
The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that an employee could
recover under both the KRS section 342.730(1)(c) schedule of
benefits and section 342.730(1)(c)(27). 82 Relying upon the earlier
decision of Blair v. General Electric Co., 3 the Court in Jones ruled:
[T]he Board must make a finding of whether the effects of any
of the injuries or disabilities to a member of the body adversely
affect claimant's ability to labor or limit his occupational oppor-
tunities to obtain the kind of work he is customarily able to do.
If so, then, and in that event, his compensation benefits must
not be limited to the price tag amounts, and he shall be awarded
compensation benefits under some other applicable or ap-
propriate section of KRS Chapter 342 which would provide more
compensation benefits for his disability. In other words, as we
have stated heretofore, the price tag statute provides a minimum
amount of recovery.84
Even before the Jones decision was issued, section 342.730 was
'OId. at 421. KRS § 342.730(1)(c) (1977) was amended in 1980 so as to eliminate the
schedule of benefits. See Act of Apr. 2, 1980, ch. 104, § 15, 1980 Ky. Acts 191, 200 (codified
at KRS § 342.730(1)(b) (1983)).
" KRS § 342.730(I)(c)(27) (1977), repealed by Act of Apr. 2, 1980, ch. 104, § 15,
1980 Ky. Acts, 191, 200.
" 613 S.W.2d at 423.
" 565 S.W.2d 631 (Ky. 1978). In Blair, an employee was awarded the scheduled
benefits for total loss of vision in one eye, but the Court reasoned that a laborer who loses
one eye will additionally suffer some loss of occupational opportunities. Thus, the Court
ruled that the employee was also entitled to have the degree of his occupational disability
determined by the Board under KRS § 342.730(1)(c)(27). Id. at 633.
1 613 S.W.2d at 423.
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amended and the benefits schedule of subsection (1)(c) was
eliminated. 5 These amendments, however, have not diminished the
importance of Jones. The 1980 amendments have merely
substituted the "AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Im-
pairment" for the benefits schedule.16 Thus, the concepts enun-
ciated in Jones which require the Board to make a finding as to
the existence of both occupational disability and medical functional
impairment, and then award the claimant the greater of the two,
are still being carried forward by the courts as evidenced by Hester.
D. Reopening
By statute, a party may ask the Board to reopen any case to
review an otherwise final award or order upon "a showing of
change of conditions, mistake or fraud or newly discovered
evidence."8 s7 In the seminal case of Osborne v. Johnson,"8 the Court
held that the term "change of conditions" meant a change of the
worker's physical condition; 9 a mere change in the worker's
economic conditions was not a change of conditions within the
meaning of the statute.9" In Mitsch v. Stauffer Chemical Co.," the
Court reinterpreted "change of conditions" to also encompass a
change in occupational disability.9" Although the Court did not ex-
pressly distinguish Osborne,9" it was-clear that the Court had ex-
panded the basis for reopening a claim.
In the recent case of Continental Air Filter v. Blair,9" the in-
terpretation of "change of conditions" was expanded further. Blair
had lost all fingers on both hands except one index finger and both
thumbs. Initially, the Board awarded him fifty percent disability,
" See Act of Apr. 2, 1980, ch. 104, § 15, 1980 Ky. Acts 200, 202.
16 See KRS § 342.730(1).
, KRS § 342.125(1).
, 432 S.W.2d at 800.
Id. at 805 (emphasis in original).
90 Id. at 804-05.
487 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1972).
Id. at 939. According to the Court, the Workers' Compensation Act was established
to compensate occupational disability; thus, a subsequent change in occupational disabil-
ity would be a sufficient basis to reopen a case. Id. at 939-40.
" The Court cites Osborne without any distinguishing language. See id. at 939.
30 KLS 8, at 5 (Ky. Ct. App. July 7, 1983), reh'g denied, 30 KLS 10, at 9 (Ky.
Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1983), discretionary rev. filed, 30 KLS 11, at 24 (Sept. 22, 1983).
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but noted that it would have found him 100 percent disabled if he
had not been working." The Board also said that the case could
be reopened upon a change of condition.9" At the time of the
award, Blair was working as a quality control inspector requiring
primarily visual duties. He was then transferred to foreman of the
night shift. When the night shift was eliminated, he was returned
to the day shift in a new capacity, conducting inventory. Follow-
ing the issuance of the Board opinion, it became apparent that Blair
could not perform these duties, and he was eventually discharged
when the employer could not provide him with other work.91 The
court of appeals, distinguishing Osborne v. Johnson on the facts,
held that such a change in the economic conditions of the worker
was sufficient for a reopening. 98
Although Continental Air Filter Co. v. Blair at first blush seems
to plow new ground in Kentucky, this decision may be limited to
its facts. At the time of the original opinion, Blair held a "made
work" job, since the position in quality control did not exist prior
to his injury and was not filled after his transfer. 99 The Board, in
its discretion, had simply limited the amount of compensation to
be paid by the employer so long as it provided a job to the
employee. Once the employer became unable to provide a job, the
employee was entitled to an award of total, permanent disability.'
The court in Continental Air Filter referred to Dolt & Dew, Inc.
v. Smith,' ' in which an award of permanent partial disability was
changed to total disability when the employer went out of business.
The Court in Dolt & Dew had ruled:
[T]hat the Board was justified in determining that Smith's





"I0 The court held in part: "[Blecause Blair could not perform the duties assigned to
him after the 1975 accident, the Workers' Compensation Board correctly increased his
disability from 50% to 100%." Id.
,0, 493 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1973). While Dolt & Dew is not a reopening case, the reasoning
of the Court in that case should carry over. The court in Continental Air Filter obviously
believed the reasoning applied since the case was cited as additional authority. See Con-
tinental Air Filter v. Blair, No. 82-CA-1660-MR, slip op. at 5-6 (Ky. Ct. App. July 1, 1983)
(this discussion does not appear in KLS).
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disability, the effects of which were not fully realized, perma-
nent and partial so long as he was afforded work by his employer
that he was able to do, proved to be total and permanent when
his employer went out of business and no other work was
available to him in the area's labor market." 2
E. Presumptions
In occupational disease cases, the Workers' Compensation Act
provides that an employee may take advantage of certain presump-
tions concerning causation when a diagnosis of a compensable
pneumoconiosis is made following an exposure of ten or more
years.' 0 3 For example, when an employee files an application for
adjustment of a claim accompanied by two medical reports, the
burden of proof shifts to the employer and the Special Fund." 4
In two recent cases, the court of appeals held that the presump-
tions do not entitle the employee to an award in the face of con-
flicting evidence,'0 5 nor do the presumptions relieve the worker of
the ultimate burden of persuasion.
0 6
In Kington v. Zeigler Coal Co. , O7 the employee had supported
his claim with the testimony of two general practitioners, while a
pulmonary specialist and a radiologist testfied that the employee
was not suffering from compensable pneumoconiosis.'10 When the
Board denied benefits, the employee appealed, arguing that the
statutory presumptions entitled him to an award.' 9 The court of
102 493 S.W.2d at 713.
103 See KRS § 342.316(5). This statute provides: "Where the occupational disease is
a compensable pneumoconiosis and there has been employment exposure for ten (10) years
or more to an industrial hazard sufficient to cause the disability of pneumoconiosis there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that the disability or death was due to the compensable
pneumoconiosis." Id.
10, KRS § 342.316(2)(b)(2) states:
The filing of a properly executed application for adjustment of claim, accom-
panied by the two medical reports described in subparagraph 1 of this paragraph,
shall satisfy the requirements of the presumptive clause set out in subsection (5)
of this section and the burden of proof shall immediately thereafter shift to the
employer.
,o' See Wells v. Hamilton, 645 S.W.2d 353 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983). For a discussion of
this case see text accompanying notes 113-18 infra.
,6 See Kington v. Zeigler Coal Co., 639 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982). See text
accompanying notes 107-12 infra for a discussion of this case.
,0, 639 S.W.2d at 560.




appeals held that the testimony of the pulmonary specialist and the
radiologist rebutted the presumption created by the filing of the
application supported by two medical reports." II If the employer
had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to the contrary, the
presumption would have won the case for the employee. Since the
evidence introduced was deemed sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion, the Board then found the employer's evidence that the
employee did not suffer a compensable pneumoconiosis more con-
vincing, and denied the employee's claim.' While the presump-
tion will relieve the employee of the initial burden of production
of evidence, it does not relieve the employee of the burden of
persuasion. ",2
In Wells v. Hamilton,'' 3 the employee had filed a claim sup-
ported by two medical reports and then introduced the statements
of three physicians attesting that he suffered from pneumoconiosis,
while the employer and the Special Fund introduced the testimony
of four physicians to the contrary." 4 The Board concluded that
the case presented a close factual issue as to whether the employee
suffered from pneumoconiosis but since the plaintiff was entitled
to the presumptions contained in KRS section 342.316(2)(b)(2) and
section 342.316(5), the Board found that the employee had a com-
pensable occupational pneumoconiosis." 5
In extending the holding of Kington v. Zeigler Coal Co., the
court of appeals stated that when the employer and the Special
Fund have introduced probative medical evidence that the worker
does not suffer from the disease, the Board is not entitled to rely
upon the statutory presumptions. ' 6 By relying on the statutory
presumptions, the Board had avoided having to determine which
medical evidence to believe." 7 The presumptions may prevail only
if no substantial evidence to the contrary is introduced. The Board
may not abdicate its role as the fact finder by use of the statutory
", Id. at 562.
Id.
' Id.
645 S.W.2d at 353.






presumption when conflicting medical evidence is introduced." 8
The effect of these two cases is to leave intact the presump-
tion as a procedural hurdle for the employer to overcome after the
employee has filed a claim properly supported by two medical
reports. Once the employer introduces substantial evidence to the
contrary, however, the presumptions in favor of the employee dis-
appear and the Board must determine the dispute based upon the
evidence presented in the record." 9
F. Statute of Limitations
The period of limitation for an employee to bring an action
under the Workers' Compensation Act is two years from the date
of injury or two years after the cessation of voluntary payments
of income benefits.'20 But, the limitations period for an employer
to bring an indemnity or subrogation action before the Board of
Claims against the Commonwealth of Kentucky is one year from
the date of injury.' 2 ' Thus, if an employee were injured but did
not file his claim until more than a year after the date of the in-
jury, the employer might be left without a corresponding remedy.
The court of appeals addressed this issue in Continental Cas-
ualty Co. v. Commonwealth,'22 in which an employee recovered
an award from the Workers' Compensation Board more than one
year after the injury occurred. 23 The compensation carrier brought
an action before the Board of Claims to recoup those benefits
under theories of subrogation and indemnity pursuant to KRS sec-
tion 342.700.124 The Board of Claims dismissed the carrier's ac-
tion as barred by the one year statute of limitations. 25 However,
in order to provide a remedy to the carrier, the court of appeals
concluded that such a literal application of the statute defeated the
II Id. at 354-55.
"' Id. at 355.
20 KRS F, 342.185, .270.
KRS ' 44.110 (1980).
29 KLS 12, at 7 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1982), discretionary rev. granted, 29 KLS
15, at 14 (Ky. Dec. 15, 1982).
"I Id. at 7.
'1, Id. For a discussion of the theories of subrogation and indemnity as they apply
to workers' compensation, see text accompanying notes 158-75 infra.
"1 29 KLS 12, at 7.
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whole purpose for which the rights of the employer or insurance
carrier had been created.' 26 The court chose not to impute to the
legislature an intent to produce such an absurd result. Relying upon
Taylor v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,'2 7 which stated that the court's
supreme duty in construing a statute is to carry out the legislature's
evident intention,'28 the court impliedly held that the time for com-
mencing an action in such a case does not accrue until the obliga-
tion for payment of compensation benefits by the employer or
carrier has occurred.'
2 9
In practical application, Continental Casualty Co. relieves
employers and carriers of the burden of filing an action to preserve
potential workers' compensation benefits not yet paid. On the other
hand, non-employer parties who are liable for injuries suffered by
an individual while working for another should be aware that the
employer of the injured individual or the employer's carrier could
bring an action for indemnity for compensation payments made
to the employee even after the injured party's cause of action
against the responsible party is time barred.
G. Coverage Under the Act-Exclusive Remedy
In a case of potentially far reaching significance, the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows,'30 held that
an employee who was terminated for filing a workers' compensa-
tion claim had a cause of action for compensatory damages.
Although the Court did not abandon the terminable at will doc-
trine, it did recognize the existence of exceptions to the doctrine.
In defining what kind of exceptions should be recognized the Court
quoted from the Wisconsin case of Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet: '3'
[An employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when
the discharge is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined
public policy as evidenced by existing law .... The public policy
126 Id.
"1 55 S.W.2d 410 (Ky. 1932).
12, Id. at 413.
"I See 29 KLS 12, at 7.
110 30 KLS 14, at 11 (Ky. Nov. 24, 1983).
1' 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
1983-84]
KENTUCKY LAW JoulURAL [Vol. 72
must be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision. An
employee cannot be fired for refusing to violate the constitution
or a statute. Employers will be held liable for those terminations
that effectuate an unlawful end.'
32
The Court further noted that the Workers' Compensation Act
provides a sufficient basis for an exception to the terminable at
will doctrine. 33 While KRS section 342.690 provides that the Act
is the exclusive remedy for an employee and is "in place of all other
liability of such employer to the employe... on account of such
injury," '31 the Court nonetheless recognized that an employer who
terminates an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim
has interfered with an important public interest. 35 The Court
stated: "The only effective way to prevent an employer from in-
terfering with his employee's right to seek compensation is to
recognize that the latter has a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge when the discharge is motivated by the desire to punish
the employee for seeking the benefits to which he is entitled by
l a w . , ,13 6
Now that an exception has been recognized to the old doctrine
of terminable at will,' 37 the question will be how far to take this
"1 30 KLS 14, at 11 (quoting Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d at 840).
As further support, the Court referred to KRS § 446.070 (1975): "A person injured by the
violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by
reason of the violation ...."
"1 30 KLS 14, at 11.
13- KRS § 342.690(1) (1983).
30 KLS 14, at 12. The Court stated:
It is an important public interest that injured employees shall receive, and
employers shall be obligated to pay, for medical expenses, rehabilitative services
and a portion of lost wages. Injured employees should not become public charges.
If that is the public policy of Kentucky, and it is, then action on the part of an
employer which prevents an employee from asserting his statutory right to medical
treatment and compensation violates that policy.
Id.
136 Id. The Court, in an effort to "suitably" control the cause of action for wrongful
discharge, adopted the rule that the initial determination of whether the discharge was in
violation of a constitutional or implicit statutory right was for the court as a question of
law. 30 KLS 14, at 11 (citing Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d at 841).
131 Under Kentucky case law, an employee hired for an indefinite term is subject to
discharge at the discretion of his employer. See Production Oil Co. v. Johnson, 313 S.W.2d
411 (Ky. 1958); Gambrel v. UMW, 249 S.W.2d 158 (Ky. 1952); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp.,
551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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implied duty. Other courts have extended such a concept beyond
the bounds of a statutory right such as workers' compensation and
have found a basis for an implied duty to continue employment
in employee manuals'38 or in the employer-employee relationship
itself."' Only time will tell whether Meadows is the beginning of
the end for "terminable at will" employment in Kentucky.
Further limiting the exclusive remedy doctrine of the compen-
sation act, the court in Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, ,40 refused
to extend the Act to cover alleged slander or false imprisonment.'4 '
The court drew a distinction based upon the purpose of the Act
to compensate an employee for physical and mental injuries aris-
ing from the employment relationship as opposed to a claim not
requiring a showing of actual damage and held that the Act re-
mained limited to compensation for such actual injuries.'
42
In Kentucky Farm and Power Equipment Dealers Association
v. Fulkerson Brothers, Inc., 4 the Court ruled that an unpaid of-
ficer of a trade association was not an employee within the Act. 44
The plaintiff served as vice president of a family-owned corpora-
tion engaged in the sale of farm equipment, while he also served
as president of Kentucky Farm and Power Equipment Dealers
Association, Inc., an unpaid position of a nonprofit trade associa-
tion. The plaintiff was injured while in the course of his duties with
the trade association. '4 Concluding that he was not an "employee"
of the trade association within the purview of the compensation
act, the Court viewed the definition of employee under the Act as
more narrow than that of "servant" in a master-servant
relationship.' 46 The "threshold requirement" is that the employee
"' See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). But see
Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1975). See generally Annot., 12 A.L.R.4th
544, 567-72 (1982).
See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
But see Martin v. Tapaley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978). See generally Annot., supra note
138, at 560-67.
1"o 627 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
I4 Id. at 278-79.
141 Id. at 279.
1- 631 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1982).
" Id. at 634.
Id. at 634-35.
,6 Id. at 635.
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must be one for hire, since the purpose of the Act is to compen-
sate for lost wages.'1 7 The Court found the language of KRS sec-
tion 342.640(2), which extends coverage of the Act to an "executive
officer of a corporation" to refer to an employee for hire and not
voluntary or honorary employees.' 41 While the result in this case
appears to be equitable, the Court may have written into the com-
pensation act a distinction that might have been better left to the
legislature.
Since Miller v. Scott,"4 9 the Act has prohibited an action by
one employee against another for negligence in causing a work-
related injury.'5  The Court in Kearns v. Brown,'5' however, ruled
that if an employee by his actions removed himself from the course
of his employment he would lose the immunity of the Act."'5 The
decedent was a passenger in an automobile driven by a fellow
employee at the request of their employer. They had maintained
a steady course toward their intended destination. However, dur-
ing this trip the driver was playing "chicken" with approaching
vehicles by crossing over the center line and then attempting to
switch back into the proper lane in time to pass safely.'53 While
the case was remanded to the trial court for a determination as to
whether the driver was acting in the course and scope of his
employment,' 54 the court still concluded that if the driver's acts
were not within the scope of his employment, then he would not
1' Id.
149 Id.
"1 339 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1960).
110 In Miller v. Scott, the plaintiff was injured in an accident during the course of his
employment. Id. at 942. He was riding in a truck driven by a co-employee, when the truck
collided with an automobile. The plaintiff filed a negligence action against the co-employee,
but the trial court interpreted the Act to preclude this suit. Id. at 943. Although no specific
statute prohibited the action, the Court contended that the intent of the Act was to cover
all industrial accidents and provide the exclusive remedy unless expressly excluded by the
statute. Id. at 943-44.
When KRS § 342.690 (1983) was enacted in 1972, the following provision was added:
"The exemption from liability given an employer by this section shall also extend to such
employer's carrier and to all employes, officers or directors of such employer or carrier.
." See Act of Mar. 17, 1972, ch. 78 § 9, 1972 Ky. Acts 305, 315.
"' 627 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 591.
Id. at 590-91.
'11 Id. at 591.
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be entitled to immunity from his co-employee's action for
damages.' 5
KRS section 342.610(3) grants the employer a defense from
liability to the employee only for injuries primarily caused by the
employee's intoxication or the employee's willful intention to in-
jure himself or another. 5 6 No exclusion exists, however, under the
statute for horseplay or gross negligence.' 57 The court's conclusion
in Kearns might have been different, if the decedent had filed a
compensation claim against the employer and the employer had
argued that the driver/employee had removed himself from the
course of his employment. In this situation, a potentially incon-
sistent result is possible since an employer could be held liable by
the Board because the injury was not intentional. The employee
would then seem entitled to immunity under KRS section 342.690,
yet under Kearns the co-employee could be liable because his ac-
tions, though unintentional, removed him from the course of
employment. If the intent of the Act is to provide an exclusive
remedy, then such inconsistent results should not be allowed.
H. Indemnity and Subrogation
Through a series of recent cases, the Kentucky courts have
reevaluated the rules as to the application of indemnity and
subrogation in workers' compensation. It has long been recognized
in Kentucky that a third party tortfeasor may not obtain contribu-
tion from an injured employee's employer.5 8 But, the rights of
subrogation and indemnity, also once well established, have recently
been changed. In American States Insurance Co. v. Audubon
Country Club,' 9 the Court ruled that a compensation carrier does
not have an independent right of indemnity against a third party
tortfeasor when an injured employee obtains recovery from such
13 Id.
156 "[L]iability for compensation shall not apply where injury, occupational disease
or death to the employe was proximately caused primarily by his intoxication or by his willful
intention to injure or kill himself or another." KRS § 342.610(3) (1983).
"' See id. The parties had for some reason stipulated that the driver/employee was
engaged in horseplay. 627 S.W.2d at 590.
"' See, e.g., Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bertram & Thacker, 453 S.W.2d 591 (Ky.
1970); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Griffin Constr. Co., 280 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1955).
1"9 650 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1983).
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third party, but is limited to its right of subrogation as governed
by KRS section 342.700.160 The Court found no need to preserve
the independent right of indemnity since KRS section 342.700 pro-
vided a complete and adequate remedy to the compensation
carrier. 1 If the carrier wants to protect its subrogation right, then
an action must be filed in the carrier's name or employee's name
at the time the employee files an action against the third party
tortfeasor.'6 2 With the recent holding in Continental Casualty Co.
v. Commonwealth, which extends the statute of limitations on the
employer's and the insurance carrier's right of indemnity until
liability is known,' 3 the need for a separate and independent ac-
tion on the part of the carrier or the employer would be remote.
In 1981, in Union Carbide Corp. v. Sweco, Inc., 64 the court
160 Id. at 255. KRS § 342.700 (1983) provides:
Whenever an injury for which compensation is payable under this chapter has
been sustained under circumstances creating in some other person than the
employer a legal liability to pay damages, the injured employe may either claim
compensation or proceed at law by civil action against such other person to
recover damages, or proceed both against the employer for compensation and
such other person to recover damages, but he shall not collect from both. If the
injured employe elects to proceed at law by civil action against such other per-
son to recover damages, he shall give due and timely notice to the employer of
the filing of such action. If compensation is awarded under this chapter, the
employer, his insurance carrier, the special fund, and the uninsured employer's
fund, or any of them, having paid the compensation or having become liable
therefor, may recover in his or its own name or that of the injured employe from
the other person in whom legal liability for damages exists, not to exceed the
indemnity paid and payable to the injured employe, less the employe's legal fees
and expense.
1 650 S.W.2d at 255. A prior case, Hillman v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 631
S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1982), set forth a formula under which damages recovered by the employee
from a third party are to be divided with the subrogating insurance carrier. For a discus-
sion of this case, see Harned & Hopgood, Kentucky Law Survey-Workers' Compensa-
tion, 70 Ky. L.J. 499 (1981-82).
362 650 S.W.2d at 255. The court of appeals, in an unpublished decision, has held that
the insurance carrier has no separate cause of action for indemnity, and if the employee
files an action against the third party tortfeasor, the insurance carrier must intervene in
the employee's action in order to assert its subrogation tights. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Fireman's Fund, No. 80-CA-2054-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 22, 1981), discretionary
rev. granted, 81-SC-583-D (Ky. Oct. 27, 1981), discretionary rev. dismissed, 81-SC-583-DG
(Ky. Mar. 9, 1982).
36 29 KLS 12, at 7. For a discussion of this case see text accompanying notes 122-29
supra.
-6- 610 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), discretionary rev. denied, 613 S.W.2d 138
(Ky. 1981).
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of appeals reaffirmed the proposition that the exclusive remedy pro-
vision of the Act would not bar a third party from maintaining
an indemnity action against the employer. 16 The court of appeals
followed precedent ' and held that the common law right of in-
demnity is a jural right which may not be abolished by the
legislature. "7
The decision in Union Carbide Corp. v. Sweco, however, was
overruled sub silentio by Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Govern-
ment Employees Insurance Co.' 68 This decision held that the pro-
visions of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act,'69 which limited the
insurance carrier's right to seek recoupment from a third party
tortfeasor,11° did not violate the Kentucky Constitution. 7' The
Court reasoned that since the no-fault and compensation acts did
not exist in 1891, the indemnity sought under such acts also did
not exist in 1891 and thus could be abolished by the legislature. 1
72
While Fireman's Fund does not involve a workers' compen-
sation situation, the Court's reasoning paves the way for a strict
application of KRS section 342.690. This statute states, in relevant
part:
(1) If an employer secures payment of compensation as required
by this chapter, the liability of such employer under this chapter
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such
employer to the employe, his legal representative, husband or
wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise en-
565 Id. at 934. These cases typically arise when an employee files an action against a
negligent third party, who in turn files a third party complaint against the employer seek-
ing indemnity and alleges that its negligence was merely passive while the negligence of the
employer was active.
"I See, e.g., Kentucky Utils. Co. v. Jackson County Rural Elec. Coop., 438 S.W.2d
788 (Ky. 1968). Based on extensive case law, the Court said the existence of the common
law right of indemnity in Kentucky is "unquestionable." Id. at 790.
"1 610 S.W.2d at 934.
56 See 635 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1982) (opinion does not mention Union Carbide).
519 KRS §§ 304.39-010 to -340 (1981), otherwise known as the no-fault act.
170 See KRS §§ 304.39-070(3)-(4), .39-140(3) (1981).
"1 635 S.W.2d at 475. Ky. CoNsT. § 14 provides that "[aill courts shall be open, and
every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or
delay." See also KY. CoNsT. § 54 which denies the legislature the power "to limit the amount
to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property."
"7 635 S.W.2d at 477.
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titled to recover damages from such employer at law or in ad-
miralty on account of such injury or death .... The liability of
an employer to another person who may be liable for or who has
paid damages on account of injury or death of an employe of
such employer arising out of the and in the course of employ-
ment and caused by a breach of any duty or obligation owed by
such employer to such other shall be limited to the amount of
compensation and other benefits for which such employer is
liable under this chapter and on account of such injury or death,
unless such other and the employer by written contract have
agreed to share liability in a different manner.'
A strict application of this statute would deny a third party an in-
dependent right of indemnity against the employer beyond the
amount of compensation benefits awarded under the Act. Once
the compensation benefits are paid, the liability of the employer
to both the employee and the third party ceases.
While the decision in Fireman's Fund establishes that the
legislature may abolish the right of indemnity without violating the
constitution, the question still remains as to whether the legislature
may only limit the right of indemnity. This question was express-
ly left undecided by the court of appeals in Union Carbide Corp.
v. Sweco, Inc. 174 It seems illogical that the legislature could abolish
indemnity but could not limit this right. A limitation on the right
of indemnity of a third party is arguably unfortunate, since the
third party could be held liable by the employee for passive
negligence in light of the employer's active negligence and have no
right of recourse as against the employer. Under the specific
statutory provisions, however, no other result is possible.
" KRS § 342.690 (emphasis added).
11 See 610 S.W.2d at 934.
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